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The Cost of Government Financial Interventions, Past and Present 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Between March and September 2008, the federal government intervened financially with private 
corporations on three occasions, resulting in the government receiving significant debt and equity 
considerations. The firms affected were Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and AIG. 
Dissatisfaction with the case-by-case approach to addressing the ongoing financial turmoil led Treasury 
to propose a more comprehensive approach on September 19, 2008. On October 3, 2008, the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act (EESA, P.L. 110-343) was signed into law, authorizing the Troubled Assets 
Relief Program (TARP). TARP gave Treasury the option of purchasing or insuring up to $700 billion of 
assets from financial firms. On October 14, 2008, Treasury announced it was shifting its focus towards 
direct capital injections into banks through the purchase of preferred shares. Treasury’s announced 
“capital purchase plan” was for purchasing up to $250 billion in financial firms’ preferred stock under the 
TARP authority, with approximately $187.5 billion actually purchased as of December 31, 2008. 
In addition to the general capital purchase plan, there have been several other case-by-case interventions 
since the passage of the EESA. The initial $85 billion AIG loan from mid-September was first augmented 
and then revamped into a combination package of a $60 billion line of credit, $40 billion in preferred share 
purchases, up to $20.9 billion in commercial paper purchases, and up to $52.5 billion in troubled asset 
purchases. Citigroup received an additional $20 billion in preferred share purchases after an initial $25 
billion, along with federal guarantees to cover losses on a $306 billion pool of assets. The U.S. 
automakers also received financial assistance through TARP, with a $5 billion preferred share purchase 
from GMAC, up to $14.4 billion in loans to GM and up to $4 billion in loans promised to Chrysler. 
These interventions have prompted questions regarding the taxpayer costs and the sources of funding. 
The sources of funding are relatively straightforward—primarily the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the U.S. 
Treasury. The costs, however, are difficult to quantify at this stage. In most of the interventions, many of 
the financial outflows that are possible have yet to occur, and the ultimate value of the debt and equity 
considerations received from the private firms is uncertain. At this point, the federal government has the 
option to own nearly 80% of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG. Depending on the final proceeds from the 
various debt and equity considerations, the federal government may end up seeing a positive fiscal 
contribution from the recent interventions, as was the case in some of the past interventions summarized 
in the tables at the end of this report. The government may also suffer significant losses, as has also 
occurred in the past. 
This report will be updated as warranted by legislative and market events. 
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Between March and September 2008, the federal government intervened financially with private 
corporations on three occasions, resulting in the government receiving significant debt and equity 
considerations. The firms affected were Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and AIG. 
Dissatisfaction with the case-by-case approach to addressing the ongoing financial turmoil led 
Treasury to propose a more comprehensive approach on September 19, 2008. On October 3, 
2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA, P.L. 110-343) was signed into law, 
authorizing the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). TARP gave Treasury the option of 
purchasing or insuring up to $700 billion of assets from financial firms. On October 14, 2008, 
Treasury announced it was shifting its focus towards direct capital injections into banks through 
the purchase of preferred shares. Treasury’s announced “capital purchase plan” was for 
purchasing up to $250 billion in financial firms’ preferred stock under the TARP authority, with 
approximately $187.5 billion actually purchased as of December 31, 2008. 
In addition to the general capital purchase plan, there have been several other case-by-case 
interventions since the passage of the EESA. The initial $85 billion AIG loan from mid-
September was first augmented and then revamped into a combination package of a $60 billion 
line of credit, $40 billion in preferred share purchases, up to $20.9 billion in commercial paper 
purchases, and up to $52.5 billion in troubled asset purchases. Citigroup received an additional 
$20 billion in preferred share purchases after an initial $25 billion, along with federal guarantees 
to cover losses on a $306 billion pool of assets. The U.S. automakers also received financial 
assistance through TARP, with a $5 billion preferred share purchase from GMAC, up to $14.4 
billion in loans to GM and up to $4 billion in loans promised to Chrysler. 
These interventions have prompted questions regarding the taxpayer costs and the sources of 
funding. The sources of funding are relatively straightforward—primarily the Federal Reserve 
(Fed) and the U.S. Treasury. The costs, however, are difficult to quantify at this stage. In most of 
the interventions, many of the financial outflows that are possible have yet to occur, and the 
ultimate value of the debt and equity considerations received from the private firms is uncertain. 
At this point, the federal government has the option to own nearly 80% of Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and AIG. Depending on the final proceeds from the various debt and equity considerations, 
the federal government may end up seeing a positive fiscal contribution from the recent 
interventions, as was the case in some of the past interventions summarized in the tables at the 
end of this report. The government may also suffer significant losses, as has also occurred in the 
past. 
This report will be updated as warranted by legislative and market events. 
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Between March and September 2008, the federal government intervened financially with private 
corporations on three occasions, resulting in the government receiving significant debt and equity 
considerations. The firms affected were Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and AIG. 
Dissatisfaction with the case-by-case approach to addressing the ongoing financial turmoil led 
Treasury to propose a more comprehensive approach on September 19, 2008. On October 3, 
2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA, P.L. 110-343) was signed into law, 
authorizing the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). TARP gave Treasury the option of 
purchasing or insuring up to $700 billion of assets from financial firms. On October 14, 2008, 
Treasury announced a Capital Purchase Program, under which it would use the TARP authority to 
purchase banks’ preferred stock rather than the mortgage-related assets that had previously been 
the primary focus. Other interventions under TARP have included a restructuring of the support 
for AIG, preferred share purchase and asset guarantees for Citigroup, and loans and preferred 
share purchase to support U.S. automakers. 
These interventions have prompted questions regarding the taxpayer costs and the sources of 
funding. The sources of funding are relatively straightforward; the costs, however, are difficult to 
quantify at this stage. Many of the financial outflows that are possible have yet to occur, and the 
ultimate value of the debt and equity considerations received from the private firms is uncertain. 
At this point, the federal government has the option to own nearly 80% of Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and AIG, as well as loans to, and preferred stock holdings in, a large number of institutions. 
Depending on the final proceeds from the various debt and equity considerations, the federal 
government may end up seeing a positive fiscal contribution from the recent interventions, as was 
the case in some of the past interventions summarized in the tables at the end of this report. The 
government may also suffer significant losses, as has also occurred in the past. 

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In the recent interventions, there have been two primary sources of immediate funding: the 
Federal Reserve (Fed) and the U.S. Treasury.1 Under its founding statute, the Fed has the 
authority to loan money “in unusual and exigent circumstances” to “any individual, partnership, 
or corporation” provided five members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system 
agree.2 This authority has been cited in three of the interventions in 2008, namely Bear Stearns, 
AIG, and Citigroup. The source of money loaned under this section derives from the Fed’s general 
control of the money supply, which is essentially unlimited subject to the statutory mandates of 
maintaining stable inflation and promoting economic growth.3 Because the profits of the Fed are 
overwhelmingly remitted to the Treasury, the indirect source of the funds is the Treasury. In the 
case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the direct source of funding is the Treasury, pursuant to the 
statutory authority granted in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.4 In the case of 
                                                                
1
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) will absorb up to $5 billion in losses from the guarantee of 
Citigroup assets. 
2
 12 U.S.C. Sec. 343. 
3
 For more information on the Federal Reserve’s actions, please see CRS Report RL34427, Financial Turmoil: Federal 
Reserve Policy Responses, by Marc Labonte. 
4
 P.L. 110-289, Title I. 
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the Troubled Assets Relief Program, the direct source of funding is the Treasury, pursuant to the 
statutory authority granted in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.5 Treasury 
finances these activities by issuing bonds and increasing the federal debt. 
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Determining the cost of government interventions, particularly those currently in progress, is not 
straightforward. Assistance often comes in forms other than direct monies from the Treasury, 
including loan guarantees, lines of credit, or preferred stock purchases. Such assistance may have 
little or no up-front cost to the government, although loan guarantees in legislation are scored by 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as an up front budgetary cost. This score reflects the fact 
that a loan guarantee, which can be thought of as a sort of insurance, has value even if it is never 
used. Many insurance policies are never used, but individuals and companies purchase them to 
reduce the risk of loss. In many past cases, the value to various companies of federal guarantees 
was to enable them to access the private credit markets, issuing bonds or obtaining bank loans 
that they would not otherwise have been able to obtain. In other past cases, the federal guarantee 
resulted in a lower interest rate on the bonds or loans. 
Depending on the conditions attached to each specific intervention and how events proceed 
thereafter, the government may see a net inflow of funds from the actions taken, rather than a net 
outflow. Even with a net inflow of funds, however, intervention may have a cost if this inflow is 
less than the benefit that could have been derived from expending the funds for another purpose. 
The summaries below address the maximum amounts promised in federal assistance and attempt 
to quantify the amounts that have actually been disbursed. There are also other, more diffuse costs 
that could be weighed. For example, many would argue that the cost to the taxpayers of any 
intervention should be weighed against the potential costs of financial system instability resulting 
from inaction, or that one intervention may lead to more private sector risk-taking, and thus 
necessitate additional future interventions (moral hazard). Such costs, however, are even harder to 
quantify than the realized cost of the interventions. This report acknowledges but does not 
attempt to address them. 
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As the government intervened in 2008 to prevent the failure of troubled financial firms, market 
conditions seemed to get worse instead of better. After the initial AIG intervention, Treasury 
argued that a more comprehensive solution was needed to restore financial calm. It proposed 
creating a Troubled Assets Relief Program to purchase up to $700 billion of troubled assets from 
financial firms as a way to restore investors’ confidence in the health of the financial sector. It 
was argued that financial firms would be unable to replenish their capital (by selling equity to 
private investors) unless certain assets were transferred to the government. Once financial 
                                                                
5
 P.L. 110-343, Division A, Title 1. 
6
 See CRS Report RL34730, The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and Current Financial Turmoil: Issues and 
Analysis, by Baird Webel and Edward V. Murphy. 
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markets stabilized, Treasury would be able to sell these assets, recouping some or perhaps all (if 
asset prices rose above their purchase price) of the costs. 
On October 3, 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA, Division A of P.L. 110-
343) was signed into law, creating TARP. In addition to an asset purchase program, P.L. 110-343 
included an insurance program providing federal guarantees for troubled assets in return for 
premiums paid by companies. It also allowed the government to take an equity stake in 
companies participating in the asset purchase program. P.L. 110-343 provided broad discretion to 
the Treasury to design the parameters of the program, making it difficult to evaluate the ultimate 
costs of the program at this time. 
Under the Credit Reform Act and P.L. 110-343, CBO has projected that the total net cost to the 
government of the $700 billion outlaid under TARP will be approximately $185 billion in net 
present value terms.7 CBO makes this estimate by comparing the price paid by the government to 
acquire assets under TARP to the present discounted value of future income accruing to the 
government from the assets plus future proceeds from the sale of the assets, using a discount rate 
that has been adjusted for the risks inherent in holding the assets being purchased.  
	
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On October 14, 2008, Treasury announced its ongoing focus would be to inject capital directly 
into financial institutions through the purchase of preferred stock rather than purchasing the 
troubled assets that had previously been the focus of the program. Treasury also announced that 
nine large banks were participating in the initial preferred share purchase, which amounted to 
$125 billion. Treasury indicated that an additional $125 billion was being reserved for preferred 
share purchases from smaller banks. As of December 31, 2008, approximately $62.5 billion of the 
$125 billion for smaller banks had been used. 8 
In addition to the general capital purchase program, the purchase of preferred shares under TARP 
has been a component of several of the specific interventions detailed below. 
!"#	
On December 20, 2008, the U.S. Treasury announced it was providing support through 
TARP to General Motors and Chrysler. The package included up to $13.4 billion in a 
secured loan to GM and $4 billion in a secured loan to Chrysler. In addition, up to $1 
billion was lent to GM for its participation in a rights offering by GMAC, GM’s former 
financing arm which is now becoming a bank holding company. GMAC also received a 
$5 billion capital injection through preferred share purchases. As of December 31, 2008, 
the Treasury reports that $10.4 billion had been disbursed to GM, $5 billion to GMAC, 
and $4 billion to Chrysler.9 The secured loans to the automakers are contingent on their 
                                                                
7
 Congressional Budget Office, Budget and Economic Outlook, p. 25, Jan. 2009. More specifically, CBO projects that 
transactions undertaken in 2009 will have a net present value cost of $180 billion and transactions undertaken in 2010 
will have a net present value cost of $5 billion. 
8
 Figures taken from the Treasury’s TARP Transactions Report for the period ending Dec. 31, 2008, available at 
http://ustreas.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/001-06-09-CPP-Report.pdf. 
9
 Figures taken from the Treasury’s TARP Transactions Report for the period ending Dec. 31, 2008, available at 
http://ustreas.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/001-06-09-CPP-Report.pdf. 
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producing plans for long-term profitability by March 31, 2009 at which point the loans 
can be called if these plans are judged unsatisfactory. 
$
On November, 23, 2008, the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC announced a joint intervention 
in Citigroup, which had previously been a recipient of $25 billion in funding under TARP’s 
general capital purchase program. This specific intervention consisted of an additional $20 billion 
purchase of preferred shares under TARP and a government guarantee for a pool of $306 billion 
in Citigroup assets. The guarantee is in place for 10 years for residential assets and 5 years for 
non-residential assets. Should there be losses on the pool, Citigroup will exclusively bear up to 
the first $29 billion. Any additional losses will be split between Citigroup and the government, 
with Citigroup bearing 10% of the losses and the government bearing 90%. The first $5 billion of 
government’s losses would be borne by the Treasury using TARP funds; the next $10 billion 
would be borne by the FDIC; all further losses would be borne by the Fed through a non-recourse 
loan. Citigroup will pay the federal government a fee for the guarantee in the form of preferred 
stock. The assets will remain on Citigroup’s balance sheet, and Citigroup will receive the income 
stream generated by the assets. 
	%	&$%& 
On September 16, 2008, the Fed announced that it was taking action to support AIG, a federally 
chartered thrift holding company with a broad range of businesses, primarily insurance 
subsidiaries, which are state-chartered. This support took the form of a secured two-year line of 
credit with a value of up to $85 billion. The interest rate on the loan was relatively high, 
approximately 11.5% on the date it was announced. AIG also was to pay interest on the amount of 
the credit line that it did not access. In addition, the government received warrants to purchase up 
to 79.9% of the equity in AIG. On October 8, the Fed announced that it would lend AIG up to a 
further $37.8 billion against investment-grade securities held by its insurance subsidiaries. These 
securities had been previously lent out and were not available as collateral at the time of the 
original intervention. AIG also announced that it had applied to the Fed’s general Commercial 
Paper Facility and was approved to borrow up to $20.9 billion. 
The financial support for AIG was restructured in early November 2008. The restructured 
financial support includes 
• A $60 billion loan from the Fed, with the term lengthened to five years and the 
interest rate reduced by 5.5%. 
• $40 billion in preferred share purchase through the TARP Capital Purchase 
Program. These shares pay a 10% dividend. 
• $52.5 billion total in asset purchases by the Fed through two Limited Liability 
Corporations (LLCs) known as Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III. AIG is 
contributing an additional $6 billion for the LLCs and will bear the first $6 
billion in any losses on the asset values. Any gains from these LLCs will be 
shared between the government and AIG. 
• $20.9 billion in possible lending through the Fed’s commercial paper facility. 
This was unchanged from the previous approval. 
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The 79.9% equity position of the government in AIG remains essentially unchanged after the 
restructuring of the intervention. As of December 31, 2008, the Fed reported that $38.9 billion 
had been lent directly to AIG, while the two LLCs supporting AIG have purchased at total of 
$46.9 billion in assets.10 The $40 billion in preferred share purchase through TARP was 
completed on November, 25, 2008. As of November 5, 2008, AIG indicated it had borrowed 
$15.3 billion from the Fed’s commercial paper facility. 
'		'		
On September 7, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac into conservatorship.11 As part of this conservatorship, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
have signed contracts to issue new senior preferred stock to the Treasury, which has agreed to 
purchase up to $100 billion of this stock from each of them. The Treasury agreed to make open 
market purchases of Fannie Mae- and Freddie Mac-issued mortgage-backed securities. Treasury 
has said that it expects to profit from the spread between the interest rate that it pays to borrow 
money through bonds and the mortgage payments on the mortgage-backed securities. Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac will guarantee payment of the securities. Treasury agreed that if the companies 
have difficulty borrowing money, which has apparently not been the case to date, Treasury will 
create a Government Sponsored Enterprise Credit Facility to provide liquidity to them, secured by 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) pledged as collateral. There are no specific limits to these 
purchases or loans, but they are subject to the statutory limit on the federal government’s debt. In 
return for the Treasury support, each company issued the Treasury $1 billion of senior preferred 
stock without additional compensation, as well as warrants (options) to purchase up to 79.9% of 
each company’s common stock. Treasury’s authority to provide financial support will terminate 
December 31, 2009. According to CBO, Treasury had purchased $14 billion of preferred shares 
and $71 billion of mortgage-backed securities as of December 31, 2008. 
On a risk-adjusted present value basis, CBO estimates that Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s 
combined liabilities exceeded their assets by $200 billion at the time of conservatorship – a gap 
that will be bridged with federal funds. In addition, CBO projects that, going forward, the entities 
will undertake new business with a cumulative net cost to the government of $104 billion in risk-
adjusted present value terms (assuming no further policy change to the entities’ business 
activities). 12 
	"	
On March 16, 2008, JPMorgan Chase agreed to acquire the investment bank Bear Stearns. As part 
of the agreement, the Fed lent $28.82 billion to a Delaware limited liability corporation (LLC) 
that it created to purchase financial securities from Bear Stearns. These securities are largely 
mortgage-related assets. The interest and principal will be repaid to the Fed by the LLC using the 
funds raised by the sale of the assets. The Fed’s loan will be made at an interest rate set equal to 
                                                                
10
 See Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1, dated Jan. 2, 2009, Table 1, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/Current/. 
11
 For more information see the September 7, 2008 statement by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson at 
http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm; and CRS Report RL34661, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Financial 
Problems, by N. Eric Weiss. 
12
 Congressional Budget Office, Budget and Economic Outlook, p. 26, Jan. 2009. 
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the discount rate (2.5% when the terms were announced, but fluctuating over time) for a term of 
10 years, renewable by the Fed.13 In addition, JPMorgan Chase extended a $1.15 billion loan to 
the LLC that will have an interest rate equal to 4.5 percentage points above the discount rate. 
Thus, in order for the principal and interest to be paid off, the assets will need to appreciate 
enough or generate enough income so that the rate of return on the assets exceeds the weighted 
interest rate on the loans (plus the operating costs of the LLC). The interest on the loan will be 
repaid out of the asset sales, not by JPMorgan Chase. 
Any difference between the proceeds and the amount of the loans will produce a profit or loss for 
the Fed, not JPMorgan Chase. Because JPMorgan Chase’s $1.15 billion loan was subordinate to 
the Fed’s $28.8 billion loan, if there are losses on the $29.95 billion assets, the first $1.15 billion 
of losses will be borne, in effect, by JPMorgan Chase. If the assets appreciate in value by more 
than operating expenses, the Fed will make a profit on the loan. If the assets decline in value by 
less than $1.15 billion, the Fed will not suffer any direct loss on the loan. Any losses beyond 
$1.15 billion will be borne by the Fed. By the end of 2008, these assets had suffered 
approximately $3 billion in losses.14 
Table 1. Summary of Current and Historical Financial Interventions by the  
Federal Government 
Beneficiary Action Financial Commitment Final Cost to Treasury 
U.S. Banks/TARP Capital 
Purchase Program 
(October 14, 2008) 
Purchase of preferred 
shares 
Up to $250 billion 
announced; $187.5 billion 
in actual outlays 
Unknown (Treasury 
receives dividends on 
stock, plus sale value of 
stock at the end of the 
program.) 
U.S. Automakers 
(December 19, 2008) 
Secured Loan 
Up to $13.4 billion 
announced 
Unknown (Treasury 
receives interest on the 
loans as well as stock 
warrants.) 
GMAC 
(December 29, 2008) 
Purchase of preferred 
shares; secured loan 
$5 billion direct to GMAC; 
up to $1 billion through 
General Motors. 
Unknown (Treasury 
receives dividends on 
stock, interest on the loan, 
plus sale value of stock at 
the end of the program.) 
Purchase of preferred 
shares 
$45 billion total through 
TARP ($25 billion through 
initial Capital Purchase 
Program)  
Unknown (Treasury 
receives dividends on 
stock, plus sale value of 
stock at the end of the 
program.) 
Citigroup 
(October 14, 2008; 
November 23, 2008) 
Guarantee of asset pool Up to $249.3 billion 
Unknown (Government 
receives preferred stock as 
fee for the guarantee.) 
                                                                
13
 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Summary of Terms and Conditions Regarding the JP Morgan Chase Facility,” 
press release, March 24, 2008. 
14
 See Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1, dated Jan. 2, 2009, Table 1, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/Current/. 
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Beneficiary Action Financial Commitment Final Cost to Treasury 
Five-Year Secured Loan 
from the Federal Reserve 
Up to $60 billion against 
the general assets of AIG 
Unknown (Government 
receives interest on loan 
plus stock warrants on up 
to 79.9% of AIG’s equity.) 
Purchase of preferred 
stock 
$40 billion through TARP 
Unknown (Treasury 
receives dividends on 
stock, plus sale value of 
stock at the end of the 
program.) 
Asset Purchase through 
LLC controlled by the 
Federal Reserve 
Up to $52.5 billion 
Unknown (The Fed LLC 
receives relatively illiquid 
assets.) 
AIG  
(September 16, 2008; 
November, 10, 2008) 
 
Commercial Paper 
Purchase by the Fed 
Up to $20.9 billion 
Unknown (Interest is paid 
to the Fed)  
Senior Preferred Stock 
Purchase 
Initial commitment, $100 
billion each; ultimately, no 
set limit  
Unknown (Treasury 
receives $1 billion (each) 
of preferred stock and 10% 
accrual on the stock.) 
Purchase of Mortgage-
Backed Securities issued by 
the companies 
No set limit 
Unknown (Treasury 
receives interest on any 
MBS purchased and may 
sell the securities in the 
future.) 
Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac  
(September 7, 2008) 
 
Credit Facility No set limit; collateralized 
Unknown (Treasury 
receives interest on any 
loans taken.) 
Bear Stearns  
(March 14, 2008) 
 
Asset Purchase through 
LLC controlled by the 
Federal Reserve 
$28.8 billion 
Unknown (The Federal 
Reserve LLC received 
$29.95 billion in relatively 
illiquid assets.) 
U.S. Airlines  
P.L. 107-42  
(September 22, 2001) 
Loan Guarantees Up to $10 billion 
None except implicit value 
of loan guarantees; under 
$2 billion in loans made.  
Savings and Loan Failures  
P.L. 101-73  
(August 9, 1989) 
Savings and Loan Failures 
and Insolvency of Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation 
Full faith and credit backing 
of Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance 
Corporation 
$150 billion. 
Chrysler  
P.L. 96-185  
(January 7,  
1980) 
Loan Guarantees $1.5 billion 
$311 million profit from 
sale of warrants. 
New York City  
P.L. 95-339  
(August 9, 1978) 
Loan Guarantees 
$1.65 billion in guaranteed 
bonds 
None, except the implicit 
value of loan guarantee. 
New York City  
P.L. 94-143  
(December 9, 1975) 
Short-Term Loans $2.3 billion 
None, except the implicit 
cost of the risk of loan. 
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Beneficiary Action Financial Commitment Final Cost to Treasury 
Penn Central  
P.L. 93-236  
(January 2, 1974) 
Loan Guarantees in the 
wake of Railroad 
Bankruptcy 
$125 million loan 
guarantees; 
$7 billion in federal 
operating subsidies 
$3 billion net loss after 
sale of ownership stake 
plus the implicit value of 
loan guarantee. 
Lockheed  
P.L. 92-70  
(August 9, 1971) 
Loan Guarantees 
$250 million of loans 
guaranteed for five years 
with three year renewal; 
guarantee and 
commitment fees charged 
$31 million profit from sale 
of warrants less the lost 
value of loan guarantee. 
Source: CRS 
 
(%
 
Baird Webel 
Analyst in Financial Economics 
bwebel@crs.loc.gov, 7-0652 
 
N. Eric Weiss 
Specialist in Financial Economics 
eweiss@crs.loc.gov, 7-6209 
Marc Labonte 
Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy 
mlabonte@crs.loc.gov, 7-0640 
  
 
 
 
 
